Rudolf Schuessler (Universität Bayreuth)
ABSTRACT: The
scholastics used probabilis as predicate for the legitimate adoption of
opinions. In the Middle Ages, an opinion was mainly called probable if
it was, according to Aristotle's topical definition, held by "the wise
and the many". On this basis, two logically incompatible opinions could
be considered probable at the same time, yet without entailing the
rational assertability of both sides in a dispute. This changed in 17th
century scholasticism. After a short flourishing of watered down, but no
longer Aristotelian characterizations of scholastic probability, the
predicate probabilis was widely defined as explicitly entailing rational
assertability. The simultaneous rational assertability of incompatible
opinions by epistemic peers (and hence the possibility of reasonable
disagreement) was justified by some scholastics with a distinction
between commensurable and incommensurable evidence. Moreover, weak and
strong forms of rational assertability were distinguished and, at least
by one influential author, explained with a lottery paradox. In sum,
detailed accounts of the possibility of reasonable disagreement emerged
in Baroque scholasticism.
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