P. F. 2015
V novém roce s novými starými Studiemi! Články k tématu (filosofické) antropologie, metafyziky a logiky, spolu s krátkou zprávou k etice.
středa 31. prosince 2014
sobota 6. prosince 2014
Studia Neoaristotelica 2014-2
Nové číslo Studií Neoaristotelica jde do tiskárny!
The second issue of 2014 contains a paper in the philosophy of mathematics, two in epistemology and one in logic. In "Toward a Neoaristotelian Inherence Philosophy of Mathematical Entities” Dale Jacquette develops a Neoaristotelian philosophy of mathematics, seen as an alternative to both Platonism and nominalism, by providing an account of: (a) the inherence relation that obtains between “secondary substances” (mathematical properties) and the "primary substances" (individual concrete physical entities) in which they are embodied and inhere in; (b) the mathematical formalism that apparently cannot be applied to anything in the dynamic spatiotemporal physical world. Within this Neoaristotelian framework Jacquette proposes to explain the relation between pure and applied mathematics and the Neoaristotelian status of practically inapplicable mathematical languages. In "Givens and Foundations in Aristotle's Epistemology" Miguel García-Valdecasas discusses features that set off Aristotle's foundationalism from more recent "classical foundationalism". In Aristotle's epistemology, for instance, the first principles ("axiómata") are self-evident, but not self-justificatory; they are intellectual, rather than perceptual, so that none of them concerns our immediate experience (although the senses are needed for induction which provides the first universals). The unique features of Aristotle's epistemology make it resistant to the common objections to classical foundationalism. In “De ontologico logicae fundamine meditatio” (a paper written in Latin!) Walter Redmond presents a sketch of a simple interpreted formalism designed to capture the traditional (as opposed to modern) understanding of certain basic logical and metaphysical concepts, including modal ones, and in turn applies it to elucidation of some aspects of traditional ontology and philosophical theology. Finally, in “Response to ‘Hilderbrad vs. Groarke’ by Vlastimil Vohánka” Louis Groarke defends an account of induction as an “immediate leap of reason” against various other attempts to defend it, in particular Bernoullian statistics. Induction is not a matter of probability and enumeration but of explanatory causality. Its foundation is the mental capacity to grasp that which is needed for explanation. Along the way Groarke provides a clear and amply illustrated introduction into the basic concepts and features of Aristotelian essentialism.
The second issue of 2014 contains a paper in the philosophy of mathematics, two in epistemology and one in logic. In "Toward a Neoaristotelian Inherence Philosophy of Mathematical Entities” Dale Jacquette develops a Neoaristotelian philosophy of mathematics, seen as an alternative to both Platonism and nominalism, by providing an account of: (a) the inherence relation that obtains between “secondary substances” (mathematical properties) and the "primary substances" (individual concrete physical entities) in which they are embodied and inhere in; (b) the mathematical formalism that apparently cannot be applied to anything in the dynamic spatiotemporal physical world. Within this Neoaristotelian framework Jacquette proposes to explain the relation between pure and applied mathematics and the Neoaristotelian status of practically inapplicable mathematical languages. In "Givens and Foundations in Aristotle's Epistemology" Miguel García-Valdecasas discusses features that set off Aristotle's foundationalism from more recent "classical foundationalism". In Aristotle's epistemology, for instance, the first principles ("axiómata") are self-evident, but not self-justificatory; they are intellectual, rather than perceptual, so that none of them concerns our immediate experience (although the senses are needed for induction which provides the first universals). The unique features of Aristotle's epistemology make it resistant to the common objections to classical foundationalism. In “De ontologico logicae fundamine meditatio” (a paper written in Latin!) Walter Redmond presents a sketch of a simple interpreted formalism designed to capture the traditional (as opposed to modern) understanding of certain basic logical and metaphysical concepts, including modal ones, and in turn applies it to elucidation of some aspects of traditional ontology and philosophical theology. Finally, in “Response to ‘Hilderbrad vs. Groarke’ by Vlastimil Vohánka” Louis Groarke defends an account of induction as an “immediate leap of reason” against various other attempts to defend it, in particular Bernoullian statistics. Induction is not a matter of probability and enumeration but of explanatory causality. Its foundation is the mental capacity to grasp that which is needed for explanation. Along the way Groarke provides a clear and amply illustrated introduction into the basic concepts and features of Aristotelian essentialism.
Přihlásit se k odběru:
Příspěvky (Atom)
