----------
Thomas Pink (London) Reason and Obligation in Suarez
Článek se zabývá zdrojem morální závaznosti. Jedná se o velmi podbrobný článek na téma, se kterým nejsem přiliš dobře obeznámen. Přebírám proto shrnutí od B. Hilla z úvodu knihy (tučné zvýraznění je opět moje vlastní):
"Thomas Pink ... examines how Suarez fundamentally altered the traditional conception of obligation and ushered in the modern conception of it by reconceiving of its basis in reason itself. The obligatoriness of the moral law, according to Suarez, does not lie within the power or authority of the law-giver as judge and punisher. Rather it lies in the rationality of the directives of the moral law itself. 'The bining authority of the natural law does not lie in any reason to obey it that derives from fear of sanction. Its authority is simply that of reason itself and consists in a distinctive vis directiva, that is adirective force of reason,' argues Pink.
Pink contrast two models for obligatoriness, the Force Model and the Feature Model. The Feature Model conceives of obligation as simply a reason-giving feature of morally prescibed actions. Moral obligation is thus likened to other reason-giving features, like fear of punishment from a sovereign. And this makes it quite apt for a model of legal obligatoriness, according to Pink. But it is less apt for moral obligatoriness. The Force Model is better for conceiving of that. Under the Force Model of moral obligatoriness, moral obligatoriness is not an additional feature added to a moral action. It is a distinctive kind of justificatory force within practical reason. It is a specially obligating force inherent to the action, what Pink calls 'the force of Demand.' Along with this special kind of force comes a special kind of criticism or sanction - those who disregard the 'force of Demand' are blameworthy not only becausse of foolishness but more importantly because of literal wrongdoing.
After contrasting these two models of moral obligatoriness Pink shows conclusively that Suarez adopted something like the Force Model. This can be seen in an assumption pervading Suarez's entire accoung of obligation - we must follow the dictates of the laws of nature simply because they are the laws of reason. This assumption, argues Pink, is only possible within the framework of a Force Model of obligatoriness. No adherent of a Feature Model can admit such a claim. Moreover, argues Pink, Suarez's account of legal obligation built upon this Force Model conception of moral obligation, further revealing Suarez's commitment to it.
Pink then traces the uses and developments of Suarez's Force Models for moral and legal obligation throughout the early modern works of Grotius and Pufendorf. He argues for a change in Locke, however. According to Pink, Locke abandoned the Force Model for moral obligation and with this the 'force of Demand' disappeared, at least from the British tradition of natural law theory. As Pink is well aware, the German tradition is another matter, although he does not address it in this chapter." (p. 13)
Článek je rozdělen do několika částí:
I. Moral obligation and legal obligation: Is there a moral law?
Článek se zabývá zdrojem morální závaznosti. Jedná se o velmi podbrobný článek na téma, se kterým nejsem přiliš dobře obeznámen. Přebírám proto shrnutí od B. Hilla z úvodu knihy (tučné zvýraznění je opět moje vlastní):
"Thomas Pink ... examines how Suarez fundamentally altered the traditional conception of obligation and ushered in the modern conception of it by reconceiving of its basis in reason itself. The obligatoriness of the moral law, according to Suarez, does not lie within the power or authority of the law-giver as judge and punisher. Rather it lies in the rationality of the directives of the moral law itself. 'The bining authority of the natural law does not lie in any reason to obey it that derives from fear of sanction. Its authority is simply that of reason itself and consists in a distinctive vis directiva, that is adirective force of reason,' argues Pink.
Pink contrast two models for obligatoriness, the Force Model and the Feature Model. The Feature Model conceives of obligation as simply a reason-giving feature of morally prescibed actions. Moral obligation is thus likened to other reason-giving features, like fear of punishment from a sovereign. And this makes it quite apt for a model of legal obligatoriness, according to Pink. But it is less apt for moral obligatoriness. The Force Model is better for conceiving of that. Under the Force Model of moral obligatoriness, moral obligatoriness is not an additional feature added to a moral action. It is a distinctive kind of justificatory force within practical reason. It is a specially obligating force inherent to the action, what Pink calls 'the force of Demand.' Along with this special kind of force comes a special kind of criticism or sanction - those who disregard the 'force of Demand' are blameworthy not only becausse of foolishness but more importantly because of literal wrongdoing.
After contrasting these two models of moral obligatoriness Pink shows conclusively that Suarez adopted something like the Force Model. This can be seen in an assumption pervading Suarez's entire accoung of obligation - we must follow the dictates of the laws of nature simply because they are the laws of reason. This assumption, argues Pink, is only possible within the framework of a Force Model of obligatoriness. No adherent of a Feature Model can admit such a claim. Moreover, argues Pink, Suarez's account of legal obligation built upon this Force Model conception of moral obligation, further revealing Suarez's commitment to it.
Pink then traces the uses and developments of Suarez's Force Models for moral and legal obligation throughout the early modern works of Grotius and Pufendorf. He argues for a change in Locke, however. According to Pink, Locke abandoned the Force Model for moral obligation and with this the 'force of Demand' disappeared, at least from the British tradition of natural law theory. As Pink is well aware, the German tradition is another matter, although he does not address it in this chapter." (p. 13)
Článek je rozdělen do několika částí:
I. Moral obligation and legal obligation: Is there a moral law?
"Obligation is kind of directive standard on action - it directs and demands that we do what is right and avoid doing what is wrong. Obligations are often thought to exist in morality: there are supposed to be obligations that are moral. But obligations very obviously also exist under positive law: there clearly are obligations that are legal. In fact obligation is one of a range of related notions that are deployed both within morality and in positive law. Obligations, then, considered generally, are things we are responsible for meeting and which we are at fault for breaching. Thus, just as obligations can be either moral or legal we can be either morally or legally responsible and morally or legally at fault.
But if obligation, responsibility, and fault are common both to morality and to positive law, perhaps the same is true of the phenomenon of law itself. Perhaps beyond the systems of positive law contingently legislated for specific communities through statue or custom, there is a specifically moral law that applies to all humans od any community." (p. 175)
II. Moral obligation and blameIII. Moral obligatoriness as a force of practical reason
IV. Suarez and the Force Model of moral obligation
V. Moral obligation and divine command
Pink zde krátce, ale z primárních zdrojů, rozebírá diskusi mezi Suarezem, Vazquezem a Punchem:
"I have been presenting this late Scholastic natural law theory as really a theory of a distinctive justificatory force within practical reason - a force that is agency-specific, just as is moral blame. But was not the natural law also seen as a moral law in this sense, that it is as something that arises out of moral legislation and the decrees of God as moral law-giver? So it was by some, Francisco Suarez very notably included. ... But the view of natural law as arising through divine legislation was not universal in late Scholasticism. There were some who conceived of the natural law as without legislative origin, as a law without a law-maker. Such and account of how natural law exists prior to and independent of any legislation is to be found in the work of Suarez's fellow Jesuit and antagonist Gabriel Vazquez. This view of natural law also had widespread support within the early modern Scotist tradition. It can be found for example in the Franciscan John Punch's synopsis of late Scholastic views on moral obligation located in his supplement to the 1639 Lyon edition od Scotus." (p. 188)
II. Moral obligation and blameIII. Moral obligatoriness as a force of practical reason
IV. Suarez and the Force Model of moral obligation
V. Moral obligation and divine command
Pink zde krátce, ale z primárních zdrojů, rozebírá diskusi mezi Suarezem, Vazquezem a Punchem:
"I have been presenting this late Scholastic natural law theory as really a theory of a distinctive justificatory force within practical reason - a force that is agency-specific, just as is moral blame. But was not the natural law also seen as a moral law in this sense, that it is as something that arises out of moral legislation and the decrees of God as moral law-giver? So it was by some, Francisco Suarez very notably included. ... But the view of natural law as arising through divine legislation was not universal in late Scholasticism. There were some who conceived of the natural law as without legislative origin, as a law without a law-maker. Such and account of how natural law exists prior to and independent of any legislation is to be found in the work of Suarez's fellow Jesuit and antagonist Gabriel Vazquez. This view of natural law also had widespread support within the early modern Scotist tradition. It can be found for example in the Franciscan John Punch's synopsis of late Scholastic views on moral obligation located in his supplement to the 1639 Lyon edition od Scotus." (p. 188)
VI. Obligation under natural and positive law: Force and feature
"Throughout De legibus Suárez made an essential distinction between the coercive force of human law ... and the normative directive force ... . [I]t became tempting, indeed virtually unavoidable, for subsequent English language theorists of law, from John Locke onwards, to identify the obligatoriness of a law in part of whole with the threat of sanctions that enforced it. But for Suárez as for other late Scholastics the coercive and directive forces of a law are utterly distinct. One is a threat but the other is a justificatory force. Ana each can exist without the other. Wrongdoings bring with it desert of punishment, true, but whether a punishment is actuallz imposed is another matter. ... The issue of whether something is morally obligatory is quite distinct, Suárez realized, from the issue of whether its doing is actually to be enforced by sanctions." (p. 195)
VII. The Force Model and its fate
VIII. Locke's Feature Model of moral obligatoriness as legal obligatoriness
"... 'divine command' theories of moral obligation do not form a single philosophical category. Some divine command theories are versions of the Feature Model and as in Locke's are openly reductive in attmptiong to explain what moral obligation is in other terms, such as by identifying moral obligatoriness with the property of being divinely sanctioned and commanded. ...
Other divine command theories, like Suarez's, are quite different. Suarez was not reducing moral obligatorieness in other terms. Far from claiming to explain it in other terms, Suarez hapilly used the notion in his specification of the content of the very legislative volition by which a superior imposes obligations. The content of the volition was not that given action be performed but that a given action be obligatory. For Suarez, then, obligatoriness was not being reduced to something else. The notion was a primitive idea within practical reason, no less basic than the equally primitive notion of advisability. Suarez's tying of moral obligatoriness to legislation was thus not part of aprogramme of explaining what moral obligation is in other terms but rather of giving an ethically and metaphysically satisfying account of what kinds of feature are needed to generate the force of moral obligation.
In part Suarez was driven by a deeply held intuition that unless a justificatory force is generated by the will or decree of a superior it can only be a force of advice. For advice, the force of consilia, is the justificatory force asserted by equals to equals and is the only justificatory force possible in the absence of a superior-inferior relation. As Aquinas noted: 'On the second point we should say that to advise is not a peculiarly legal act, since it can apply also to a private person who is not in a position to make law. ... ' [ST 1b.92a2 resp ad sec]
Suarez agreed. Simply to point out that some things are good and others are bad is to speak not preceptively but only indicatively. It is to stay within the realm of advice, and not to attain that of demand and obligation. For obligation some command of a superior imposing the obligation is required." (p. 205)
IX. The place of obligation in practical reason
"... 'divine command' theories of moral obligation do not form a single philosophical category. Some divine command theories are versions of the Feature Model and as in Locke's are openly reductive in attmptiong to explain what moral obligation is in other terms, such as by identifying moral obligatoriness with the property of being divinely sanctioned and commanded. ...
Other divine command theories, like Suarez's, are quite different. Suarez was not reducing moral obligatorieness in other terms. Far from claiming to explain it in other terms, Suarez hapilly used the notion in his specification of the content of the very legislative volition by which a superior imposes obligations. The content of the volition was not that given action be performed but that a given action be obligatory. For Suarez, then, obligatoriness was not being reduced to something else. The notion was a primitive idea within practical reason, no less basic than the equally primitive notion of advisability. Suarez's tying of moral obligatoriness to legislation was thus not part of aprogramme of explaining what moral obligation is in other terms but rather of giving an ethically and metaphysically satisfying account of what kinds of feature are needed to generate the force of moral obligation.
In part Suarez was driven by a deeply held intuition that unless a justificatory force is generated by the will or decree of a superior it can only be a force of advice. For advice, the force of consilia, is the justificatory force asserted by equals to equals and is the only justificatory force possible in the absence of a superior-inferior relation. As Aquinas noted: 'On the second point we should say that to advise is not a peculiarly legal act, since it can apply also to a private person who is not in a position to make law. ... ' [ST 1b.92a2 resp ad sec]
Suarez agreed. Simply to point out that some things are good and others are bad is to speak not preceptively but only indicatively. It is to stay within the realm of advice, and not to attain that of demand and obligation. For obligation some command of a superior imposing the obligation is required." (p. 205)
IX. The place of obligation in practical reason
"According to Locke we ought to comply with obligations because it is sensible to do so; and it is sensible because otherwise we shall be punished for non-compliance." (p. 206)
James Gordley (Tulane): Suarez and Natural Law
(Skvělý příspěvek, citáty ještě doplním; opět diskutuje i tehdejší barokní autory: Vazquez, Molina, Lessius)
----------
(Skvělý příspěvek, citáty ještě doplním; opět diskutuje i tehdejší barokní autory: Vazquez, Molina, Lessius)
Žádné komentáře:
Okomentovat