Aristotelský filosofický systém (Lear a Heidegger)

Plnost, s níž Lear ilustruje na konkrétních příkladech stěžejní pojmy Aristotelovy filosofie (Geertz by řekl že poskytuje "hustý popis"), mi připomíná přístup ražený Martinem Heideggerem. Alespoň tak soudím z NDPR recenze nedávného anglického překladu Heideggerových přednášek o základních pojmech aristotelské filosofii (Heidegger je přednesl v Marburgu v létě 1924):

"What Heidegger seeks to uncover in Aristotelian concepts is their Bodenständigkeit, translated here as "indigenous character". In other words, the meaning of concepts is to be traced back to the ground on which they originally stood. This basis is a concrete experience of phenomena, and this "basic experience is primarily not theoretical, but instead lies in the commerce of life with its world"..."

Recenzent (Richard Polt) uvádí například Heideggerovu interpretaci ousia jako tam-bytí-pro-mne (vlastní zdůraznění):

"For instance, the central term ousia (usually rendered as being, substance, or essence) refers to possessions in ordinary Greek (18). The ontological concept grows from the everyday experience of owning and using things. This is not to suggest, however, that ordinary language provides a final answer to the meaning of ousia; it is only a "clue" (20). "Life moves in a natural intelligibility of that which is immediately meant by 'being' and 'beings' in its speaking" -- but this average, everyday meaning is "worn out, used, used up" (21, 16). Ontological concepts grow from a familiar sense of being that is felt and lived, but philosophers must resist the thoughtless repetition of idle talk that is part of this ordinary experience (184-188). We must elucidate philosophical concepts neither through formal definitions nor through a simple appeal to common usage, but by digging deeper into the experienced phenomena that call for this usage. Thus, if ousia ordinarily means "a being that is there for me … in such a way that I can use it, that it is at my disposal", this suggests that "from the outset being, for the Greeks, means being there". We must then inquire more profoundly into this experience: "what does there mean?" (19).

     As this passage illustrates, Heidegger trades on the root meaning of the word Dasein in these lectures. Instead of leaving the word untranslated, as is usual, the translators have appropriately rendered it as "being-there" (xii). Heidegger's use of Dasein here is closer to its normal German usage, which is much like that of the English "existence", than to the narrower sense that he will give it in Being and Time and later writings (roughly, the way of being that characterizes human beings). Heidegger's readings of Aristotle explore the "there" in which all beings, not only human beings, appear." NDPR recenze 

Learův a Heideggerův přístup se ovšem i podstatně liší. Lear se u snahy o "znovuoživení" základních Aristotelových pojmů v žité zkušenosti nezastavuje, ale vystupuje i k pojmovému myšlení. Lear dále připojuje i své evaluace, tj. zda může dané Aristotelovo pojetí obstát, alespoň ve světle běžných námitek, daných nedostatečným porozuměním Aristotelova stanoviska. 
      Alespoň nakolik mohu soudit z jedné recenze, Heideggerovo čtení Aristotela je nakonec tak svérázné, že k autentickému porozumnění Aristotelova myšlení nepomohou. 
      Heideggerův přístup je mi např. na jednu stranu vítaný svou empiričností: 

"Throughout these interpretations, Heidegger admires Aristotle's empiricism ... Against Platonic speculation, "Aristotle says: I must have ground under my feet, a ground that is there in an immediate self-evidence" (27)." NDPR recenze

Naneštěstí, na druhou stranu, Heidegger přenáší své přesvědčení o fundamentalitě žité zkušenosti z řádu epistemického do řádu ontologického (co je primárně poznáváno i primárně je):

However, since beings appear to human beings, Heidegger focuses on Aristotle's understanding of human life in the Nicomachean Ethics, Politics, and Rhetoric. It is quite in keeping with Heidegger's opposition to disengaged theorizing that he does not found his interpretations on the Organon, or deal with human beings only as special cases of beings as such. Logic and metaphysics need to be rooted in the experience of people who know their "way around" a particular world (25). Since our being is being-in-a-world, to understand ourselves is to understand how we are open to other beings (157). Thus human poiesis and praxis, not "the ontology of nature", provide us with the foundation of the Greek concept of being (222). This argument is later mirrored in Being and Time, where Heidegger argues that all ontology needs to be grounded in a "fundamental ontology" that explicates our own way of being (SZ 13).  NDPR recenze

Lpění na prožívaném a subjektivistický antropocetrismus je Aristotelovi cizí. Heideggerova zaslepenost vůči primátu bytí-o-sobě nebyla četbou Aristotela nabourána a jeho výkladové umění tak bylo pro aristotelismus nadobro ztraceno.