úterý 21. srpna 2012

Hill/Lagerlund: The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez


Pár citátů z první části knihy ("Background and Influence") a nějaké postřehy k nim. 

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Michael Edwards (Cambridge) "Suárez in a Late Scholastic Context: Anatomy, Psychology, and Authority"

Proč je v současnosti tak málo známá scholastika šestnáctého a sedmnáctého století? Podle Edwardse hraje velkou roli neznalost scholastického způsobu práce (intellectual practices): 

„... much of ... the intellectual map of late Scholasticism ... remains terra incognita. In some cases this uncertainty simply reflects the limits of current exploration. I contend that in some respects it also stems from a degree of inattention to the conventions and characteristic intellectual practices of late Scholasticism. These conventions and practices, specifically the distinctive use of classical, medieval, and contemprary authorities and the techniques for assesing them, formed the backbone of what might be called the late Scholastic method of proceeding as much as the rules and assumptions of syllogistic logic.“ (p. 26)

Jedním z důležitých elementů scholastického způsobu práce je citace autorit - jedná se pro současné historiky o element, který je jen obtížně uchopitelný. Jednalo se totiž o problém, se kterým se museli nějak vyrovnávat samotní scholastikové:

"... historians of late Scholasticsim face a number of conceptual problems in dealing with the tendency of authors in these traditions to cite, engage, and refute multiple authorities on disputed questions. While in some respects this method of handling autority was simply part of the Scholastic method inherited from their medieval predecessors, many sixteenth- and seventeenth-century authors cited a much greater number and variety of authorities than their predecessors. As a result, modern scholars have often described the Scholastic and Aristotelian philosophy of the late Renaissance as both textually complex and radially 'eclectic' [Schmitt] or 'syncretic' [Spruit] in chracter. This complexity undoubtedly formed part of a broader dynamic within the learned world of the seventeenth century. In natural philosophy, the recovery and editing of classical texts in the sixteenth century, together with post-Reformation confessional imperatives and developments in fields such as medicine and optics, fuelled by what early modern scholars called an ‘oveabundance of books’ and modern historians have termed ‘information overload’—that is, a vast and apparently unquenchable expansion of scholarly literature. In late Scholastic psychology—the main focus of this chapter—a substantial amount of material from the cognate disciplines of anatomy and medicine was increasingly brought to bear on the study of the soul. Thus in the view of many early modern readers, as more and more books were published, the horizon of the world of learning seemed to recede ever-faster into the distance. It is worth ephasizing that this was not merely a problem of information management, or of disciplining or ordering an unruly mass of material ... it was also a genuine philosophical issue. Late scholastic authors like Suarez were frequently faced both with an ever-expanding field of authorities whose opinions required attention and with the need to tackle newly emerging or resurgent problems and texts. The strategies they used in response shed significant light on some of the ways in which Scholasticism in the sixteenth and seventeenth century differed from medieval and classical approaches to Aristotle. ” (p. 26)

Tedy, stručně shrnuto, citace autorit je důležité téma:

„My starting assumption is that the use made of authority in late Scholasticism is not merely an explanandum, but also an appropriate topic in the history of philosophy.“ (p. 27)

Po tomto velkolepém nastínění zásadně důležitého tématu, se dozvíme na jakém konkrétním případě bude Edwards toto téma studovat: na pouhých dvou citacích (!) v nichž Suarez ve svém komentáři De anima zmiňuje dílo De corpore animato (1610) italského jezuity Girolamo Dandiniho (Hieronymus Dandinus, 1554-1634). 

Proč užívá Suárez tohoto díla (a ne např. přímo dílo Andrea Vesaliho De humani corporis fabrica, 1543). Podle Edwardse:

“Essentially, Dandinus tackled the eye in greater detail and from the same disciplinary and confessional perspective as Suarez-on this one question, he acted as a reliable Jesuit clearing-house of anatomical knowledge.” (s. 35)

Dobrá otázka, dobře napsaný příspěvek, ovšem ve výsledku toho čtenář dostane velmi málo. Dvě citace a žádný netriviální náhled do způsobu citace. Edwards měl alespoň rozšířit své zkoumání o další autory - anatomii např. obsahuje Izquierův Pharus scientiarum (04.07.2011etc), tj. ten by byl vhodný ke komparativnímu prozkoumání. 


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Roger Ariew (South Florida): "Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suárez: The Theory of Distinctions and Principle of Individuation"

Suáreze lze sice v jakémsi smyslu označit za tomistu (protože pro něho byl Tomáš a tomistická tradice nejdůležitější autoritou), ovšem ve skutečnosti se jeho pozice od Tomáše v mnohém odlišují a v řadě zázadních bodech jsou bližší Dunsi Scotovi. Ariew poukazuje např. na: 

  • Suárez accepted analogical predication with Thomas (DM 28.3.2), but thought that a concept of being can be found which is strictly unitary („proper and adequate formal concept of being as such is one“ DM 2.1.9)
  • Suárez accepted the Scotist dotrine of matter existing without form by divine power (DM 34.5.36)
  • Suárez argues, however, against both Thomas and Scotus that the principle of individuation is matter and from together (DM 5.2.8-9)
  • against Thomas Suárez is in favor of a third distinction between the real and the rational (DM 7.1.16)
  • Suárez disputed the Thomist dotrine of a real distinction between essence and existence
 (s. 40; odkazy jsem neověřoval)

Tedy:

„On these metaphysical issues Suárez seems to have been as much a Scotist as a Thomist—or perhaps may be better understood as neither Thomist nor Scotist. This makes faily easy the task of tracing Suárez’s influence in early modern period. Taking two original Suarezian doctrines which he aligns himself with neither Thomas nor Scotus, one can detect both his influence and the limitations of that influence in Descartes and Leibniz.” p. 41

Zde se jedná o chybnou metodologii - existují jiní autoři, kteří (ať už nezávisle či závisle) hájí stejná stanoviska jako Suárez. Tj. z toho, že lze někde vystopovat Suarezovo ne-Tomášovské a ne-Scotovské stanovisko nevyplývá, že se jedná o Suárezův vliv. 

Ariew si vybral k analýze Descartovu teorii distinkcí (Principia I, 60-62) ve srovnání s DM 7 a Leibnizovu disertaci Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui (1663) spolu jeho pozdějšími spisy (bakalářská práce o eucharistii,  1668, Discours de métaphysique, sepsáno 1686) ve srovnání s DM 5.

Závěr k Descartesovi:

“Was then Descartes a reader of Suarez on the theory of distinctions? It seems plausible to presume so, though it should be noted that if he read him it was after he had already written the Meditations.” 


Ariew zvažuje vliv Eustachia a Sancto Paulo a Francoise Abra de Raconis, ovšem oba zastávají jinou klasifikaci distinkcí než Descartes a Suarez).


Závěr k Leibnizovi: 

“The inescapable conclusion here is that Leibniz wrote a Bachelor’s thesis in 1663 in which he affirmed his teacher’s position that the principle of individuation is the Suarezian whole entity as opposed to just the substantial form. But in 1668 he wrote a tract on the Eucharist in which he defended in proper persona the position that the principle of individuation is the substantial form, that is something significantly less than the whole entity. … For the Leibniz of the Discourse on Metaphysics an individual is a mind or haecceity, a Scotist individuating form, which Leibniz likened to the half of Thomas’ doctrine for individuating angels or separated intelligences.’ (p. 52-3)

Tedy:

“With Leibniz nad Descartes we have two different kinds of readers of Suarez. Even so, both were influenced by the currents of late Scholastic metaphysics—especially the metaphysics of the great Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez—although each in his own fashion.” (p. 53) 

pondělí 20. srpna 2012

Hill/Lagerlund: The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez

Konečně jsem se dostal k četbě nové (tedy teď už ne tak docela) knihy o Suárezovi, editované Benjaminem Hillem (Western Ontario) a Henrikem Lagerlundem.


Kromě úvodu od Hilla a indexu kniha obsahuje pětkrát dva plus jeden článek:

Part I: Background and Influence
1. Suárez in a Late Scholastic Context: Anatomy, Psychology, and Authority (Michael Edwards)
2. Descartes and Leibniz as Readers of Suarez: Theory of Distinctions and Principle of Individuation (Roger Ariew) 

Part II: Metaphysics
3. Shadows of Beings: Francisco Suarez's Entia Rationis (Christopher Shields)
4. Suarez on Continuous Quantity (Jorge Secada)

Part III: Natural Philosophy
5. Suarez on Propinquity and the Efficient Cause (Dennis Des Chene)
6. Suarez and the Last Stand for the Substantial Form (Helen Hattab)

Part IV: Mind and Psychology
7. Suarez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body (James B. South)
8. Suarez on Self-Awareness (Cees Leijenhorst)
9. Unity in the Multiplicity of Suarez's Soul (Marleen Rozemond)

Part V: Ethics and Natural Law
10. Reason and Obligation in Suarez (Thomas Pink)
11. Suarez and Natual Law (James Gordley)

V úvodu Hill krátce diskutuje důvody, které vedly k tomu, že je studium Suareze v současnosti tak zanedbáné (nemá zatím článek ani na SEP!), jedná se mj. o problém s periodizací (podobně jsem o tom psal ve svém článku v r. 2009):

 “No doubt, there are many reasons for this neglect. But one has particularly struck us—Suárez seems to have slipped between the cracks in our historiographical taxonomy. Suárez flourished around the time that three of our historical categories intersected, medieval philosophy (300˗1500), Renaissance philosophy (1450 ˗1600), and early modern philosophy (1600˗1800), and his work … does not obviously belong more to one than to the others.”  (p. 2)

Hill a Lagerlund potíž řeší tak, že sezvali odborníky na středověkou, renezanční i novověkou filosofii, aby se každý ze své perspektivy Suarezem zabýval:

"The problem where to pigeon-hole Suárez led Hill and Lagerlund to an innovative, interdisciplinary approach: “… we have sought to bring together historians of medieval and Renaissance philosophy with historians of early modern philosophy to approach similar themes from across Suárez’s entire philosophical corpus.”  (p. 6)

Nicméně, zdá se, že toto řešení vidí spíše jako východisko z nouze; že by raději viděli historii pojatou souvisle mezi 1400-1700 tak, jak to zmiňuje, ale nečiní, Marenbon ve své Medieval Philosophy: A Historical and Philosophical Introduction (2007):

"Although periodizations in intellectual history must be seen as tentative and plural - they are linked to particular research projects, questions and emphases - a good case can be made, given the traditions traced in this book and the type of problems on which it has dwelled, for regarding philosophy from c. 200 to c. 1700, from roughly the time of Plotinus to that of Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, as one, long period." (p. 350)  [ovšem srv. 20.04.2012etc]

A jak to činí Robert Pasnau pro téma substance ve své monumentální Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671 (2011):

„The present study seeks to learn something about the metaphysics of substance in light of four rich but for the most part neglected centuries of philosophy, running from the late medieval period to the early modern era. At no period in the history of philosophy, other than perhaps our own, have metaphysical problems received the sort of sustained attention they received during the later Middle Ages, and never has a whole philosophcal tradition come crashing down as quickly and completely as did scholastic philosophy in the seventeenth century. My hope is to understand the nature of the late medieval project, and the reasons for its demise. The very first thing that must be done, in pursuing such a project, is to find a better way to talk about these four centuries. ... I set aside all such talk of modernity, renaissainces, and middle ages. My subject is simply four centuries in the history of philosophy.“ Metaphysical Themes, 1274-1671, p.2

Ať už přistupujeme k problematice historie filosofie v letech 1400-1700 jakoli - interdisciplinárně či se snahou ignorovat zaběhnuté specializace - důležité je věnovat pozornost "pohledu zevnitř", tj. jak se viděl Suarez a jak jej viděli jiní v tradici barokní (především katolické) scholastické kultury. Tato perspektiva ovšem Hillově autorům schází. (Na rozdíl od německých autorů jako je Paul Richard Blum, Ulrich Leinsle či Sven Knebel). Proto považuje Hill (cum grano salis, samozřejmě) Suarezovu smrt za nejdůležitější událost před Descartovými (blouznivými) sny, z nichž se zrodil nový věk:
 
„Suárez died in Lisbon on the morning of 25 September 1617 after a short illness. … In about two years René Descartes would have his famous series of dreams wherein the spirit of truth commanded him to go forth and spread the news of his new universal method for philosophy, which is generally considered the beginning of philosophy’s modern age. Thus it is fitting perhaps that the death of Francisco Suarez, who despite developing and adopting so many modern philosophical ideas was nevertheless so medieval in his philosophical orientation and outlook, was the last philosophical event of note before Descartes and his dreams ushered in the so-called modern age of philosophy.” (s. 21)

pátek 17. srpna 2012

Kripke v Bambergu

Saul Kripke patří mezi nejvýznamnější filosofy minulého století. Jeho články a hlavní příspěvky jsou vesměs poměrně technické, publikoval ovšem i velmi čtivou knihu Naming and Necessity (1972/1980). V Bambergu se podařilo získat Kripkeho k účasti na letní škole, měl jsem možnost (pasivně) se zúčastnit závěrečné panelové diskuse na téma Metaphysics or Modernity? (Stávkuje mi ovšem bluetooth a tudíž se mi zatím nepodařilo přeposlat fotografie z tabletu, kterým jsem fotil; snad dodám později). Úvodní diskusi měl s Kripkem Uwe Meixner, snažil se ho přesvědčit o tom, že (některé) neexistující objekty jsou. Ani Meixner ani Kripke nemají námitky proti predikaci existence individuím.

(Dodatek, "Modrozub", tj. Bluetooth opraven): 
Kripke vpravo, vedle Meixner - oba s evidentním potěšením v modální diskusi nad neexistujícímio objekty

(Další dodatky)
Diskuse s Kripkem - zdá se, že mu drze něco vysvetluji, místo toho, aby to bylo naopak :-)



 

úterý 14. srpna 2012

Dilinganae Disputationes

"Kdo disputuje, rozlišuje pravdivé od nepravdivého" Může být tento Augustinův požadavek platit i pro jeho dědictví, pro množství akademických disputací na vysokých školách [raného novověku]?" [CIT] Tímto citátem a otázkou začíná monumentální studie Ulricha Leinsleho zabývající se filosofickým děním na Univerzitě v Dillingen v období od zahájení výuky v r. 1555 do konce třicetileté války r. 1648. Forma filosofování byla v tomto období dána disputacemi. Ty byly nejen pravidelným cvičením studentů, ale byly vyžadovány i jako závěrečná slavnostní zkouška, po níž teprve byla udělena akademická hodnost. Podklady k těmto slavnostním obhajobám byly někdy vytištěny pro širší veřejnost, podobně jako některé naše disertace (dnes ovšem disertace mají podobu esejí nikoli disputačních tezí a jsou po úpravě vytištěny až po obhajobě; navíc autory těchto disertačních tezí byli de facto profesoři nikoli studenti!). Leinsle se ve své studii krátce věnuje formě filosofických diputací a poté v několika kapitolách obšírně jejich obsahu. V závěru práce se pak vrací ke své stěžejní otázce z úvodu.
       Výzkum barokních disputačních tezí je důležitý, protože ještě více než výzkum barokních učebnic ukazuje na tematické a názorové proměny a pluralitu barokních autorů. Tito autoři podléhali řadě omezení dané univerzitním prostředím. Novověcí filosofové, pracujících mimo univerzity, se mohli věnovat libovolnému tématu jak dlouho uznali za vhodné (nakolik jim stačili prostředky) a "nikdo jim do toho nemluvil". Barokní filosofové a teologové na Univerzitě v Dillingen (podobně jako i na jiných univerzitách) měli na jednotlivé otázky, vesměs předem z Aristotelského curricula Logika - Fyzika - Metafyzika pouhé tři roky. Byli dále omezeni množstvým a nadáním studentů, střídáním kurzů podle potřeb fakulty, cenzurou nadřízených či jinými zásahy do obsahu výuky. Lze i v těchto podmínkách nalézt autentické filosofování, orientované na pravdu a nikoli na mínění autorit?
        Hledání autentického filosofování v barokním období je ztíženo tím, že pojem filosofie byl vymezen ve srovnání s dnešním pojmem zároveň úzce a široce. Za philosophia se na jednu stranu označovala spíše přípravná propedeutická nauka či umění, která řadu hlubokých filosofických problémů jako je stvoření, svoboda, hřích a milost, Bůh, atd. přenechávala teologii. Na druhou stranu se v rámci philosophia probíralo velké mnoství témat, které dnes filosofové alibisticky předávají dějepiscům vědy - témata daná Aristotelovými spisy jako je Physica, De anima, De generatione et corruptione, De caelo, Meteora, apod.

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[CIT]
"Qui enim disputat, verum discernit a falso." [Contra Cresconium I, 14, PL 43]. Kann dieser Anspruch Augustinus' auch fuer seine Erben, die zahlreichen akademischen Disputationen der Hohen Schulen gelten?" (Leinsle, Dilinganae, s. 13)

Literatura (použitá)
 Literatura (k dalšímu studiu)
  • UEDING, Gert. Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik, Bd. 2. Tübingen 1994. Především články Hanspetera Martiho: 'Controversia', (s. 380-384), 'Disputation' (s. 866-880), 'Dissertation' (s. 880-884). 
  • KNEBEL, Sven K.Wille, Würfel und Wahrscheinlichkeit Das System der moralischen Notwendigkeit in der Jesuitenscholastik 1550-1700, Hamburg: Meiner 2000. ISBN 3787315284. Obzvláště str. 15-20.
  • MARTI, Hanspeter. Další články z bibliografie, např. "Philosophieunterricht und philosophische Dissertationen im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert."

pátek 10. srpna 2012

Avicenna: autobiografie/biografie

Avicenna nám zanechal nejen velké literární dílo, ale i krátkou autobiografii. Ta byla po jeho smrti dopsána jakožto biografie jeho učedníkem Abu Ubaydem. Text je pozoruhodný, zde je anglický překlad W. Gohlmana její první, autobiografické části (vlastní členění a titulky):


Původ a rané dětství - studium Koránu, literatury, matematiky

My father was a man of Balkh; he moved from there to Bukhara in the days of Amir Nuh ibn Mansur, during whose reign he worked in the administration, being entrusted with the governing of a village in one of the royal estates of Bukhara. [The village,] called Kharmaythan, was one of the most important villages I in this territory. Near it is a village called Afshanah, where my father married my mother and where he took up residence and lived. I was born there, as was my brother, and then we moved to Bukhara. A teacher of the Quran and a teacher of literature were provided for me, and when I reached the age of ten I had finished the Quran and many works of literature, so that people were greatly amazed at me.

My father was one of those who responded to the propagandist of the Egyptians and was reckoned among the Ismailiyya. I From them, he, as well as my brother, heard the account of the soul and the intellect in the special manner in which they speak about it and know it. Sometimes they used to discuss this among themselves while I was listening to them and understanding what they were saying, but my soul would not accept it, and so they began appealing to me to do it [to accept the their doctrines.] And there was also talk of philosophy, geometry, and Indian calculation. Then he [my father] sent me to a vegetable seller who used Indian calculation and so I studied with him. 

Studium práva, logiky, Eukleida, Ptolemaia

At that time Abu Abd Allah al-Natili, who claimed to know philosophy, arrived in Bukhara; so my father had him stay in our house and he devoted himself to educating me. Before his arrival I had devoted myself to jurisprudence, with frequent visits to Ismail the Ascetic about it. I was a skillful questioner, having become acquainted with the methods of prosecution and the procedures of rebuttal in the manner which the practitiollers of it [jurisprudence] follow. Then I began to read the Isagoge under al-Natili, and when he mentioned to me the definition of genus, as being that which is predicated of a number of things of different species in answer to the question "What is it?", I evoked his admiration by verifying this definition in a manner unlike any he had heard of. He was extremely amazed at me; whatever problem he posed I conceptualized better than he, so he advised my father against my taking up any occupation other than learning. 

I continued until I had read the simple parts of logic under him; but as for its deeper intricacies, he had no knowledge of them. So I began to read the texts and study the commentaries by myself until I had mastered logic. As for Euclid, I read the first five or six figures under him; then I undertook the solution of the rest of the book in its entirety by myself.

Then I moved on to the Almagest, and when I had finished its introductory sections and got to the geometrical figures, al-Natili said to me, "Take over reading and solving them by yourself, then show them to me, so that I can explain to you what is right with it and what is wrong." But the man did not attempt to deal with the text, so I deciphered it myself. And many a figure he did not grasp until I put it before him and made him understand it. Then al-Natili left me, going on to Gurganj. 


Další studium - lékařství

I devoted myself to studying the texts-the original and commentaries--in the natural sciences and metaphysics, and the gates of knowledge began opening for me. Next I sought to know medicine, and so I read the books written on it. Medicine is not one of the difficult sciences, and therefore I excelled in it in a very short time, to the point that distinguished physicians began to read the science of medicine under me. I cared for the sick and there opened to me some of the doors of medical treatment that are indescribable and can be learned only from practice. In addition I devoted myself to jurisprudence and used to engage in legal disputations, at that time being sixteen years old. 


Then, for the next year and a half, I dedicated myself to learning and reading; I returned to reading logic and all the parts of philosophy. During this time I did not sleep completely through a single night nor devote myself to anything else by day. I compiled a set of files for myself, and for each proof that I examined, I entered into the files its syllogistic premises, their classification, and what might follow from them. I pondered over the conditions of its premises, until this problem was verified for me, And because of those problems which used to baffle me, not being able to solve the middle term of the syllogism, I used to visit the mosque frequently and worship, praying humbly to the All-Creating" until He opened the mystery of it to me and made the difficult seem easy. At night I would return home, set out a lamp before me, and devote myself to reading and writing. Whenever sleep overcame me or I became conscious of weakening, I would turn aside to drink a cup of wine, so that my strength would return to me.

Then I would return to reading. And whenever sleep seized me I would see those very problems in my dream; and many questions became clear to me in my sleep. I continued in this until all of the sciences were deeply rooted within me and I understood them as far as is I humanly possible. Everything which I knew at that time is just as I know it now; I have not added anything to it to this day.


Potíže s metafyzikou

Thus I mastered the logical, natural, and mathematical sciences, and I had now reached the science of metaphysics. I read the Metaphysics [of Aristotle], but I could not comprehend its contents, and its author's object remained obscure to me, even when I had gone back and read it forty times and had got to the point where I had memorized it. In spite of this I could not understand it nor its object, and I despaired of myself and said, "This is a book which there is no way of understanding." But one day in the after-noon when I was at the booksellers' quarter I a salesman approached with a book in his hand which he was calling out for sale. He offered it to me, but I refused it with disgust, believing that there was no merit in this science. But he said to me, "Buy it, because its owner needs the money and so it is cheap. I will sell it to you for three dirhams." So I bought it and, lo and behold, it was Abu Nasr al-Farabi's book on the objects of the Metaphysics. I returned home and was quick to read it, and in no time the objects of that book became clear to me because I had got to the point of having memorized it by heart. I rejoiced at this and the next day gave much in alms to the poor in gratitude to God, who is exalted.

It happened that the Sultan of that time in Bukhara, Nuh ibn Mansur, had an illness which baffled the doctors. Since my name had become well known among them as a result of my zeal for learning and reading, they brought me to his attention and asked him to summon me. Thus I presented myself and joined with them in treating him, and so became enrolled in his service. One day I asked him to permit me to go into their library, to get to know it and to read its books. He gave me permission and I was admitted to a building which had many rooms; in each room there were chests of books piled one on top of the other. In one of the rooms were books on the Arabic language and poetry, in another, on jurisprudence, and likewise in each room were books on a single science. So I looked through the catalogue of books by the ancients and asked for whichever one I needed. I I saw books whose names had not reached very many people and which I had not seen before that time, nor have I seen since. I read these books and mastered what was useful in them and discovered the status of each man in his science. 


So when I had reached the age of eighteen I was finished with all of these sciences; at that time I had a better memory for learning, but today my knowledge is more mature; otherwise it is the same; nothing new has come to me since.

Počátek literární činnosti (18 let)

In my neighborhood there was a man named Abu al Hasan the Prosodist, who asked me to compose for him a comprehensive work on this learning [which I had attained.] So I wrote The Compilation for him, and gave his name to it, including in it all of the sciences except mathematical science. At that time I was twenty-one years old. Also in my neighborhood there was a man named Abu Bakr al-Baraqi, a Khwarazmian by birth, and a lawyer by inclination; he was distinguished in jurisprudence, Quran commentary, and asceticism, having a liking for these sciences. He asked me to comment on the books [in these sciences], and so I wrote The Sum and Substance for him in about twenty volumes. I also wrote for him a book on ethics which I called Good Works and Evil.

These two works exist only in his possession, and he has not loaned out either one of them to be copied. Then my father died and I was free to govern my own affairs and so I took over one of the administrative posts of the Sultan. Necessity then led me to forsake Bukhara and move to Gurganj.

I where Abu al-Husayn al-Suhayli, an amateur of the sciences, was a minister. I was presented to the Amir there, Ali ibn Mamun; at that time I was in lawyer's dress, with a fold of the mantle under my chin. They gave me a monthly salary which provided enough for someone like me. Then necessity led me to move to Nasa [= Nisa, viz 13.11.2010], and from there to Baward, and then to Tus, then to Samanqan, then to Jajarm, at the extreme limit of Khurasan, and then to Jurjan. My destination was the Amir Qabus, but at that time there occurred the seizure of Qabus, his imprisonment in one of his castles, and his death there. Then I departed for Dihistan, where I became very ill, and from where I returned to Jurjan. Abu Ubayd al-Juzjani joined me there and recited to me an ode on my state of affairs which contains the poet's verse:

   When I became great, no country could hold me;
     When my price went up, I lacked a buyer.


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  • GOHLMAN, William E. The life of Ibn Sina, Arabic text and English translation of the author's autobiography, Albany, NY: SUNY, 1974. ISBN 0-87395-226-X.

čtvrtek 9. srpna 2012

Bertolacci: Aristotelova Metafyzika a Avicennův Kitab al-Šifa

Avicennovy inovace v Aristotelově pojetí metafyziky shrnuje Bertolacci takto (vlastní zvýraznění):

Avicenna’s “reform” of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in the Ilahiyyat aims primarily at providing the discipline expounded in this work with a new “form”, i.e. a proper scientific status. The epistemological profile of metaphysics that emerges from the Metaphysics is regarded as imperfect by Avicenna, who—the heir, in this, of a long tradition—endeavours to transform this discipline into a fully accomplished science. The changes that Avicenna introduces in his reworking of the Metaphysics in order to fulfill this task are profound. ...
      Avicenna’s scientific reshaping of Aristotle’s Metaphysics regards four main areas. First, Avicenna clarifies what metaphysics is about, namely whether it deals primarily with God (as in al-Kindi), or rather with “existent” (i.e. “being”) as such and its various features (as in al-Farabi); in other words, he faces the issue whether metaphysics is a philosophical theology, namely a rational investigation of God, or rather an ontology, i.e. a study of “existent qua existent” and its different aspects. Avicenna’s solution is a synthesis between these two perspectives: metaphysics is both an ontology, in so far as “existent qua existent” is its subject-matter, and a theology, since its goal is the knowledge of God (Chapter 4). Second, Avicenna recasts the structure of metaphysics in a systematic way, by dismissing the rather inconsequential order of books of the Metaphysics, and arranging this discipline according to a precise epistemological pattern (given by the species, properties and principles of “existent”), only adumbrated in Aristotle (Chapter 5). Third, he refines the method of metaphysics, by enhancing its use of demonstrations and terminological distinctions, introducing new methods of argumentation (like proofs by division and classifications), and reducing the role of procedures (like the criticism of previous philosophers’ opinions, and the discussion of aporias) cognate with dialectic (Chapter 6). Finally, Avicenna elucidates the relationship of metaphysics with the other philosophical disciplines, namely logic (the instrument of all knowledge), natural philosophy and mathematics (the other two branches of theoretical philosophy), and practical philosophy (with which he deals briefly at the end of the Ilahiyyat): metaphysics results to be a science higher than all these disciplines and encharged with providing their epistemological foundation (Chapter 7).
     The four aforementioned areas of Avicenna’s intervention are reflected in the themes discussed in the Prolegomena of the Ilahiyyat, namely in the first four chapters of this work (I, 1–4). [s. 108-9]

Avicennovo "zvědečťování" (ve smyslu: Druhých Analytik) Aristotelovy Metafyziky čerpá ze čtyř zdrojů (vlastní zvýraznění):

The scientific profile of the Metaphysics is reshaped by Avicenna in the light of four main sources. First and foremost among them are Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, the work of Aristotle’s logic deputed to establish the features that a discipline must possess in order to be a science. The link between the Ilahiyyat and the Posterior Analytics is attested by the many quotations of the Burhan in the Ilahiyyat, especially in the Prolegomena ... . The second source is book Gamma  of the Metaphysics, where Aristotle himself tentatively applies to metaphysics the epistemology of the Posterior Analytics, even though the program of “scientification” of metaphysics hinted at in Gamma is not realized in the rest of the work ... . In the historical route leading from Aristotle to Avicenna a significant role is played by Alexander of Aphrodisias, who picks up Aristotle’s unaccomplished plan of a “scientific” metaphysics and—with express and constant reference to the Posterior Analytics and special regard to book Gamma—substantiates it in his commentary on the Metaphysics. Al-Farabi, finally, resumes in the Arab world the tradition of the Greek commentators on the Metaphysics (Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Ammonius/Asclepius), and outlines a scientific configuration of metaphysics which Avicenna will receive and, with significant modifications and refinements, apply in the Ilahiyyat. [s. 109-110]

Bertolacciho studii jsem zatím jen prolistoval, důkladnost zpracování je vskutku podivuhodná. Závěrečnou pasáž je proto třeba vzít vážně (vlastní zvýraznění):

In sum: In the history of the transmission, interpretation and elaboration of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Avicenna deserves a place of eminence: he has been the first to fully clarify the epistemological status of the discipline expounded in this work (its “form”), and, at the same time, to remould the doctrine of this writing (its “content”) according to the established scientific profile. In both respects, he provides a prime example of “Peripatetic” interpretation of the Metaphysics, i.e. an interpretation of this work that takes into account, together with the original text, also the other writings of the Aristotelian corpus, the subsequent Aristotelian tradition (both Greek and Arabic), cognate types of metaphysical speculation (the Neoplatonic pseudo-Aristotelian works on metaphysics) and the cultural tendencies of his own environment (Islamic theology). Seen from all these perspectives, Avicenna’s Ilahiyyat represents an unparalleled peak in the history of the reception of the Metaphysics. If, in the Arab world, al-Farabi is rightly called the “second Teacher”, i.e. the second Aristotle, Avicenna deserves, perhaps, the appellative of “second Andronicus”: on account of his profound reworking of the epistemology and of the doctrine of the Metaphysics—as this book has tried to document—it is not far-fetched to compare the Ilahiyyat with Andronicus of Rhodes’ editorial work, and to regard this Avicennian writing as a sort of second “edition” of the Metaphysics, or second “beginning” of the Western metaphysical speculation.

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  • BERTOLACCI, Amos. The reception of Aristotle’s Metaphysics in Avicenna’s Kitab al-S’ifa: a milestone of Western metaphysical thought. Leiden: Brill, 2005  ISBN-13: 978-90-04-14899-4
Aktualizace 27.10.2013: Článek "The Transformation of Metaphysics in Late Antiquity" (in The Science of Being as Being: Metaphysical Investigations, ed. Gregory T. Doolan, 2012) fribourgského emeritního profesora antické filosofie Dominica O'Meary velmi pěkně shrnuje vznik a vývoj tradice Aristotelské metafyziky-jako-episteme (ve smyslu Druhých analytik). Čestné místo zakladatele této tradice je přisouzeno Alexandrovi z Afrodisiady (fl. 2 stol. n. l.; článek Dorothey Frede na SEP ani Adamsova episoda na se této jeho zásadní roli nevěnuje).

středa 8. srpna 2012

Bertolacci: Aristotelova Metafyzika a Avicennův Kitab al-Šifa

Již z obsahu Bertolacciho knihy (07.08.2012) je možné zahlédnout Avicennovu genialitu s níž restrukturalizoval Aristotelovu metafyziky: jedná se o vědu o jsoucím jakožto jsoucím (či existujícím jakožto existujícím, viz 03.01.2011etc) a o jeho vlastnostech. Bůh sice není předmětem této vědy ale je jejím cílem, neboť je v ní prokázán jakožto První Příčina všeho jsoucího. Co do metody postupuje metafyzika (v ideálním případě) podle Druhých Analytik (zatímco ve vlastní Metafyzice je sám Aristoteles spíše dialektik).

Ve své knize o Scotovi vyložil Lukáš Novák s obdivuhodnou rigorozitou Scotovo pojetí předmětu a metody metafyziky (22.11.2011etc). Toto metafyziky je někdy označováno za aristotelské, třebaže díky zásadnosti Avicennova přínosu by bylo přesnější říci aristotelsko-avicennovské (bez ohledu na přímost Avicennova vlivu na Scota, viz Pini). Skrze Scota a další tradiční autory a patrně i v přímém přenosu se aristotelsko-avicennovské pojetí dostalo k Suárezovi, třebaže u něho se metoda metafyziky, v protikladu vůči Avicennovi, poněkud "zdialektizovala" a vykazuje známky "právního přístupu" -- hledáme nejpravděpodobnější mínění, spíše než nevývratný důkaz.

Literatura:
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