pátek 31. srpna 2012

Hobbes: Leviathan (1651)

V roce 1648 byl uzavřen Vestfálský mír. Třebaže Anglie se této zdlouhavé a strašlivé, třicet let trvající války příliš neúčasnila, nejen Anglie ale celá Evropa ji s napětím sledovala. Tato válka vedla k mnoha hlubokým společenským změnám, z nichž si můžeme vyzvihnout dvě. Za prvé bylo otřeseno přesvědčení o křesťanských ideálech, protože zločiny a bezohledné krutosti byly páchány pod rouškou všech křesťanských náboženství - katolického, lutheránského či reformovaného. Za druhé byla definitivně uznána světská a církevní nejednotnost Evropy. V této době tedy Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) píše a publikuje svého Leviathana.
       Hobbese lze řadit do první generace post-scholastické, mimo-univerzitní filosofie, která podle Pasnaua (Metaphysical Themes, p.4)  končí nominálně r. 1671, v roce dokončení první verze Essay concerning human understanding Johna Locka (1632–1704), publikovaného ovšem až r. 1689. Z významných myslitelů této generace lze dále jmenovat Francise Bacona (1561–1626), René Descarta (1596–1650), Blaise Pascala (1623–1662), a dále Pierre Gassendiho (1592–1655) či Roberta Boyle (1627–1691). Myslitelé jako je Spinoza, Malebrache, Leibniz, a později Berkeley patří podle Pasnaua do druhé generace, Hume je ještě pozdější.
       Hobbes je nesmírně vlivný myslitel svou radikalitou, kterou ovšem jako takovou téměř nikdo nenásleduje - podobně jako radikalitu Machiavelliho (1469-1527). Nalezneme tedy spíše nesčetné varianty "Hobbes-Lite" či "Machiavelli-Lite". Hobbesova kniha navíc podnítila řadu nejrůznějších čtení, přes to, že o ní sám Hobbes říká, že je "short, and I think clear" (Lev b2ch31). Jeho důraz na absolutismus suveréna je vyrovnáván jeho porozumněním pro rovnost a jisté základní svobody (Lev b2ch21). Jeho vize lidské přirozenosti je ovšem jednoznačně negativní, přirozeným stavem je boj všech proti všem. Tento fakt je odpovědí na fundamentální otázku "Co činí autoritu legitimní?", totiž "Abychom se vyhnuli tomuto strašlivému pra-původnímu boji". Hobbes jednoznačně předpokládá mechanistické uspořádání skutečnosti, vyhýbá se teleologickému vysvětlování. Stát není zdokonalení přirozenosti, jak tomu je v klasickém pojetí od Platóna po Tomáše, ale nutností, která zabraňuje horším zlům.

Další informace:

čtvrtek 30. srpna 2012

Hobbes: Leviathan (1651)

Na LibriVox jsou namluvené i další významné knihy (srv. 16.07.2012), např. Hobbesův Leviathan, neboli látka, forma a moc státu církevního a občanského (Londýn 1651)



Název knihy je inspirován biblickou mořskou nestvůrou. Na obálce je Leviathan působivě vyobrazen jako obrovský stát tvořený z maličkých jednotlivců; v jedné ruce meč, v druhé biskupskou berlu. Dílo bylo napsáno v Paříži, kam se Hobbes jako přívrženec royalistů uchýlil těsně před vypuknutím občanské války v Anglii r. 1642.

O co v knize jde? Hobbes se snaží najít a zdůvodnit vhodné společenské uspořádání. Jádrem Hobbesovy argumentace je apel na přirozený stav člověka, který je charakterizován válkou všech proti všem. Život člověk v tomto stavu je "osamělý, bídný, brutální a krátký". Aby se člověk vyhnul tomuto stavu vytváří společenskou smlouvu v níž deleguje svá práva na suveréna. Za to se lidem dostává "míru a obrany". Suverén, ať už monarchický, aristokratický či demokratický, musí být Leviathan, vládnoucí s (téměř) absolutní autoritou.

Kniha je rozdělena do čtyř části: 
  1. O člověku (Of Man)
  2. O státu (Of Common-wealth)
  3. O křesťanském státu (Of a Christian Common-wealth)
  4. O království temnoty (O a Kingdom of Darkness)
Hobbes postupuje ve svém výkladu systematicky, od elementárnich epistemických principů po interpretaci bible. (Tuto systematičnost čerpá Hobbes podle jedné hypotézy od významného renezančního aristotelika Jacobo Zabarelly, 1533-1589 podle jiné od geometrů, viz SEP; podle mého názoru Hobbes jednoduše "pochytil" aristotelismus z univerzitních učebnic a tříd, neboť na ně - s nechutí - odkazuje téměř v každé kapitolce části 1)

Z úvod knihy (vlastní titulky a zvýraznění):

Mechanicismus: analogie stroj-člověk-stát
Příroda (umění, jímž Bůh vytvořil a řídí svět) je napodoben uměním člověka jak v mnoha jiných věcech, tak také v tom, že může vytvořit umělého živočicha. Uvážíme-li totiž, že život je jenom pohybem údu, který začíná v nějaké zásadní části uvnitř, proč bychom pak nemohli říci, že všechny automaty (stroje, které se samy pohybují pomocí pružin a koleček) mají umělý život. Neboť co je co je srdce ne-li pružina a nervy ne-li mnoho drátků a co klouby ne-li mnoho koleček, která uvádějí v pohyb celé telo, tak, jak to zamýšlel Tvůrce? Umení jde však ješte dále tím, že napodobuje ono rozumné, nejskvělejší dílo prírody, totiž člověka. Neboť uměle byl vytvoren onen velký LEVIATHAN nazývaný SPOLECENSVÍM neboli STÁTEM (v latině CIVITAS), který není nicím jiným než umelým člověkem, i když je vetší postavy a síly než prirozený člověk, k jehož ochrane a obrane byl zamýšlen. Suverenita v něm představuje umělou duši, která dává život a pohyb celému tělu. Smírčí soudci a jiní úředníci soudnictví a exekutivy jsou umělými údy; odměny a tresty (které jsou spojeny se sídlem suverenity a jimiž je každý kloub a člen veden k tomu, aby konal svou povinnost) jsou nervy, které vykonávají totéž v přirozeném tele. Blahobyt a bohatství všech jednotlivých členu představují sílu; salus populi (bezpečí lidu) je jeho úkolem; rádci, kterí mu navrhují všechny věci, jež potřebuje bezpodmínečně vědět, jsou pamětí; nestrannost a zákony jsou umělým rozumem a umělou vůlí; svornost je zdravím, vzpoura je nemocí, a občanská válka je smrtí. Konečně dohody a úmluvy, jimiž byly části tohoto politického tělesa zprvu vytvoreny, složeny a spojeny, se podobají onomu fiat nebo Učiňme člověka, což vyslovil Bůh při stvoření.
      Abych popsal přirozenost tohoto umělého člověka, budu uvažovat:

  • za prvé o látce a tvůrci; obojím je člověk;
  • za druhé, jak a kterými úmluvami vzniká stát; co jsou práva a spravedlivá moc nebo autorita nějakého suveréna; a co je zachovává a ruší;
  • za třetí, co je křesťanský stát;
  • za čtvrté, co je království temnot.

Metoda: poznej sám sebe
Co se týče prvního bodu, tak je tu nejnověji namnoze zneužívané rcení, že se moudrost nezískává čtením knih, ale lidí. Proto ty osoby, které většinou nemohou uvést žádný jiný důkaz, že jsou moudří, velmi rády ukazují, jak to zdánlivě přečetly v lidech tím, že je za jejich zády vzájemně pomlouvají. Je tu však ješte jiné rčení, kterému se již dávno rozumělo, a z něhož by se mohli opravdu naučit císt jeden z druhého, kdyby si s tím chtěli dát práci, totiž nosce te ipsum, čti v sobe samém. To neznamenalo, jak se toho dnes užívá, ani podporu barbarskému postoji držitelů moci vůči svým podřízeným ani povzbuzení
lidí z nižších vrstev k nestydatému chování vuci svým nadrízeným. Má nás to spíše poucit, že každý, kdo hledí v sebe sama a přemýšlí o tom, co ciní, když myslí, míní, usuzuje, doufá, obává se atd. a z jiných důvodů, bude pak císt a poznávat myšlenky a vášně ostatních lidí za obdobných okolností a to kvůli podobnosti myšlenek a vášní jednoho člověka s myšlenkami a vášněmi jiného. 
...
Ale nechť někdo dovede prečíst někoho jiného na základě jeho jednání sebedokonaleji, poslouží mu to jenom u jeho známého a těch je jen několik. Kdo však má vládnout celému národu, musí číst v sobě, nikoli v tom nebo onom jednotlivém člověku, nýbrž v lidském rodu. To je však težké, težší než naucit se nějakému jazyku nebo vědě. Ale podaří-li se mi řádně a jasně usporádat svou vlastní četbu, zbude na jiném jenom námaha uvažovat o tom, zda také v sobe nalezne totéž. Neboť tento druh nauky nepřipouští žádný jiný dukaz.

středa 29. srpna 2012

Církevní otcové (LibriVox a MariaLectrix)


Na LibriVox jsou od Sv. Augustina (354-430) namluvena také Vyznání (397/8) a Enchiridion (420). O křesťanské doktríně (397-426) lze nalézt na MariaLectrix, kde je také pár dopisů  Sv. Jeronýma (337/340-397) a manuál křesťanského manažmentu Rady pastýřům (590) Sv. Řehoře Velikého (540-604). Konečně, od posledního ze čtyř hlavních latinských církevních otců, Sv. Ambrože (330-397), je na LibriVox O pannách (377) a O povinnostech kněží (391).

Od řeckých církevních otců je na LibriVox Komentář k listu Galaťanům Sv. Jan Zlatoústého (349-407), Hexaemeron sv. Basila (329/30-378/9), Teologická kázání sv. Řehoř Naziánského (329-390), a Proti pohanům a  O vtělení sv. Athanáše (297-373).

úterý 28. srpna 2012

Sv. Augustin (LibriVox - O obci boží)

Dnes má svátek sv. Augustin, nejvýznamnější západní církevní otec, dobrodruh, autor gigantického filosoficko-teologického korpusu. Jedno z jeho základních děl O obci boží (413-427) jsem zatím (pro jeho délku) nebyl schopen dočíst, nicméně díky LibriVox je velká naděje, že budu schopen ho doposlouchat. Potěšení z poslechu tohoto díla je (alespoň pro mne) mnohem intenzivnější než z četby. Často se uvádí, že kniha se skládá ze dvou částí a několika podčástí:

Část I:
     Knihy 1-5: kritika římského pohanského náboženství
     Knihy 6-10: kritika pohanské filosofie
Část II:
     Knihy 11-14: původ obou obcí
     Knihy 15-18: historie obou obcí
     Knihy 19-22: zasloužený úděl obou obcí

Aktualizace 20.11.2012
Doposlouchal jsem prvních deset knih a dospěl jsem k názoru, že dělení první části, které uvádím, je nesprávné. Knihy 6-7 např. podrobně rozebírají Varronovy knihy o římském náboženství. K filosofii přechází Augustin až v kn. 8. Pozornost věnuje především platonismu.

Lepší návrh tedy zní:

Kn. 1-5:
Kritika těch, kteří tvrdí, že bohy je třeba uctívat kvůli výhodám v tomto životě.

Kn. 6-10:
Kritika těch, kteří tvrdí, že bohy je třeba uctívat kvůli výhodám v dalším životě.

Augustin reflektuje nad svým projektem na několika místech, např. v úvodu ke knize 6:

"The argument of my first five books has, I belive, given a sufficient refutation of those who suppose that many false gods are to be venerated and worshipped for advantages in this mortal life and for benefits in temporal things."

Či v první kapitolce kn. 6:

"The scheme I have prescribed for this work demands that I should now proceed to the task of refuting and instructing those who maintain that the pagan gods, which the Christian religion does away with, are to be worshipped, not with a view to this present life, but with a view to the life which is to come after death."

Shrnutí díla uvádí i ve svých Retractationes:

„However, this great undertaking was at last completed in twenty-two books. Of these, the first five refute those who fancy that the polytheistic worship is necessary in order to secure worldly prosperity, and that all these overwhelming calamities have befallen us in consequence of its prohibition. In the following five books I address myself to those who admit that such calamities have at all times attended, and will at all times attend, the human race, and that they constantly recur in forms more or less disastrous, varying only in the scenes, occasions, and persons on whom they light, but, while admitting this, maintain that the worship of the gods is advantageous for the life to come. But that no one might have occasion to say, that though I had refuted the tenets of other men, I had omitted to establish my own, I devote to this object the second part of this work, which comprises twelve books, although I have not scrupled, as occasion offered, either to advance my own opinions in the first ten books, or to demolish the arguments of my opponents in the last twelve. Of these twelve books, the first four contain an account of the origin of these two cities—the city of God, and the city of the world. The second four treat of their history or progress; the third and last four, of their deserved destinies.“

sobota 25. srpna 2012

Hill/Lagerlund: The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez

A konečně výpisky a postřehy k poslední, páté části knihy ("Ethics and Natural Law")

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Thomas Pink (London) Reason and Obligation in Suarez

Článek se zabývá zdrojem morální závaznosti. Jedná se o velmi podbrobný článek na téma, se kterým nejsem přiliš dobře obeznámen. Přebírám proto shrnutí od B. Hilla z úvodu knihy (tučné zvýraznění je opět moje vlastní):

"Thomas Pink ... examines how Suarez fundamentally altered the traditional conception of obligation and ushered in the modern conception of it by reconceiving of its basis in reason itself. The obligatoriness of the moral law, according to Suarez, does not lie within the power or authority of the law-giver as judge and punisher. Rather it lies in the rationality of the directives of the moral law itself. 'The bining authority of the natural law does not lie in any reason to obey it that derives from fear of sanction. Its authority is simply that of reason itself and consists in a distinctive vis directiva, that is adirective force of reason,' argues Pink.
       Pink contrast two models for obligatoriness, the Force Model and the Feature Model. The Feature Model conceives of obligation as simply a reason-giving feature of morally prescibed actions. Moral obligation is thus likened to other reason-giving features, like fear of punishment from a sovereign. And this makes it quite apt for a model of legal obligatoriness, according to Pink. But it is less apt for moral obligatoriness. The Force Model is better for conceiving of that. Under the Force Model of moral obligatoriness, moral obligatoriness is not an additional feature added to a moral action. It is a distinctive kind of justificatory force within practical reason. It is a specially obligating force inherent to the action, what Pink calls 'the force of Demand.' Along with this special kind of force comes a special kind of criticism or sanction - those who disregard the 'force of Demand' are blameworthy not only becausse of foolishness but more importantly because of literal wrongdoing.
       After contrasting these two models of moral obligatoriness Pink shows conclusively that Suarez adopted something like the Force Model. This can be seen in an assumption pervading Suarez's entire accoung of obligation - we must follow the dictates of the laws of nature simply because they are the laws of reason. This assumption, argues Pink, is only possible within the framework of a Force Model of obligatoriness. No adherent of a Feature Model can admit such a claim. Moreover, argues Pink, Suarez's account of legal obligation built upon this Force Model conception of moral obligation, further revealing Suarez's commitment to it.
      Pink then traces the uses and developments of Suarez's Force Models for moral and legal obligation throughout the early modern works of Grotius and Pufendorf. He argues for a change in Locke, however. According to Pink, Locke abandoned the Force Model for moral obligation and with this the 'force of Demand' disappeared, at least from the British tradition of natural law theory. As Pink is well aware, the German tradition is another matter, although he does not address it in this chapter." (p. 13) 

Článek je rozdělen do několika částí:
I. Moral obligation and legal obligation: Is there a moral law?
"Obligation is kind of directive standard on action - it directs and demands that we do what is right and avoid doing what is wrong. Obligations are often thought to exist in morality: there are supposed to be obligations that are moral. But obligations very obviously also exist under positive law: there clearly are obligations that are legal. In fact obligation is one of a range of related notions that are deployed both within morality and in positive law. Obligations, then, considered generally, are things we are responsible for meeting and which we are at fault for breaching. Thus, just as obligations can be either moral or legal we can be either morally or legally responsible and morally or legally at fault.
      But if obligation, responsibility, and fault are common both to morality and to positive law, perhaps the same is true of the phenomenon of law itself. Perhaps beyond the systems of positive law contingently legislated for specific communities through statue or custom, there is a specifically moral law that applies to all humans od any community." (p. 175)

II. Moral obligation and blameIII. Moral obligatoriness as a force of practical reason
IV. Suarez and the Force Model of moral obligation
V. Moral obligation and divine command
Pink zde krátce, ale z primárních zdrojů, rozebírá diskusi mezi Suarezem, Vazquezem a Punchem: 
"I have been presenting this late Scholastic natural law theory as really a theory of a distinctive justificatory force within practical reason - a force that is agency-specific, just as is moral blame. But was not the natural law also seen as a moral law in this sense, that it is as something that arises out of moral legislation and the decrees of God as moral law-giver? So it was by some, Francisco Suarez very notably included. ... But the view of natural law as arising through divine legislation was not universal in late Scholasticism. There were some who conceived of the natural law as without legislative origin, as a law without a law-maker. Such and account of how natural law exists prior to and independent of any legislation is to be found in the work of Suarez's fellow Jesuit and antagonist Gabriel Vazquez. This view of natural law also had widespread support within the early modern Scotist tradition. It can be found for example in the Franciscan John Punch's synopsis of late Scholastic views on moral obligation located in his supplement to the 1639 Lyon edition od Scotus." (p. 188)

VI. Obligation under natural and positive law: Force and feature  
"Throughout De legibus Suárez made an essential distinction between the coercive force of human law ... and the normative directive force ... . [I]t became tempting, indeed virtually unavoidable, for subsequent English language theorists of law, from John Locke onwards, to identify the obligatoriness of a law in part of whole with the threat of sanctions that enforced it. But for Suárez as for other late Scholastics the coercive and directive forces of a law are utterly distinct. One is a threat but the other is a justificatory force. Ana each can exist without the other. Wrongdoings bring with it desert of punishment, true, but whether a punishment is actuallz imposed is another matter. ... The issue of whether something is morally obligatory is quite distinct, Suárez realized, from the issue of whether its doing is actually to be enforced by sanctions." (p. 195)

VII. The Force Model and its fate
VIII. Locke's Feature Model of moral obligatoriness as legal obligatoriness
"... 'divine command' theories of moral obligation do not form a single philosophical category. Some divine command theories are versions of the Feature Model and as in Locke's are openly reductive in attmptiong to explain what moral obligation is in other terms, such as by identifying moral obligatoriness with the property of being divinely sanctioned and commanded. ...
      Other divine command theories, like Suarez's, are quite different. Suarez was not reducing moral obligatorieness in other terms. Far from claiming to explain it in other terms, Suarez hapilly used the notion in his specification of the content of the very legislative volition by which a superior imposes obligations. The content of the volition was not that given action be performed but that a given action be obligatory. For Suarez, then, obligatoriness was not being reduced to something else. The notion was a primitive idea within practical reason, no less basic than the equally primitive notion of advisability. Suarez's tying of moral obligatoriness to legislation was thus not part of aprogramme of explaining what moral obligation is in other terms but rather of giving an ethically and metaphysically satisfying account of what kinds of feature are needed to generate the force of moral obligation.
       In part Suarez was driven by a deeply held intuition that unless a justificatory force is generated by the will or decree of a superior it can only be a force of advice. For advice, the force of consilia, is the justificatory force asserted by equals to equals and is the only justificatory force possible in the absence of a superior-inferior relation. As Aquinas noted: 'On the second point we should say that to advise is not a peculiarly legal act, since it can apply also to a private person who is not in a position to make law. ... ' [ST 1b.92a2 resp ad sec]
       Suarez agreed. Simply to point out that some things are good and others are bad is to speak not preceptively but only indicatively. It is to stay within the realm of advice, and not to attain that of demand and obligation. For obligation some command of a superior imposing the obligation is required." (p. 205)

IX. The place of obligation in practical reason
"According to Locke we ought to comply with obligations because it is sensible to do so; and it is sensible because otherwise we shall be punished for non-compliance." (p. 206)

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James Gordley (Tulane): Suarez and Natural Law

(Skvělý příspěvek, citáty ještě doplním; opět diskutuje i tehdejší barokní autory: Vazquez, Molina, Lessius)

pátek 24. srpna 2012

Hill/Lagerlund: The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez

Pár postřehů k třetí části knihy ("Mind and Psychology") s citáty a strukturou článků.
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James B. South (Marquette) Suarez, Immortality, and the Soul's Dependence on the Body

I. The Probable arguments

II. The demonstrative arguments

III. Suarez and some texts from Aristotle

IV. Suarez and the proper operation of the intellect

Část shrnutí B. Hilla:

"South ... considers Suarez's argumens for the immortality of the soul. We have already seen in Hattab that this was a crucial premise in Suarez's general defense of substantial forms. ... South argues in particular that Suarez's thinking about the soul - anti-Averroist as it was - was distinctively shaped by Pomponazzi and his Averroist challenge to its immortality being naturally demonstrable. ... Suarez established that the soul has an operation proper to itself, argues South, by reconceiving the phantasm - intellect relation as a kind of parallelism rather than any kind of causal relationship. South calls this 'cognitive process dualism,' by which he means that 'no material cognitive process (that is, sensation) can really effect a spiritual cognitive result and no spiritual cognitive process can effect a change in the material cognitive power.' (The similarities with Descartes' infamous interaction problem are not lost to South.) This solves Pomponazzi's Averroist challenge by, in effect, making all cognitions dependent on soul and soul alone, and this is knowable through the natural light as Suarez has just shown." (p. 10)

Ze závěru:

"Let me sum up. Suarez has argued himself into an account of the intellect in which the intellect must do it all, as it were, because the traditional distinction between the agent and potential intellects has been eradicated. In addition the intellect is not causally connected to the vital opertions of the soul, the common operations. Although, thanks to an inner harmony or consonance among its powers, the intellect thinks whenever the imagination imagines. ... The thoroughgoing insistence by Pomponazzi on the inextricability of matter and form, even where that form is a human intellect, had pushed Suarez into a kind of incipient dualism. Of course he was only halfway there since he remained committed to a hylomorphic analysis of substances, including human beings and laso because he did not have Descartes' conception of matter. Nonetheless in consolidating all intellective functions within a 'mind' causally unaffected by the body he was clearly pushing the boundaries of Aristotelian thought. Hence it does not appear too surprising when Suarez writes: 'However, in human beings, even though a human being is what especially subsists, nonetheless this subsistence is due especially to the soul, which is united to a body not as if it were receiving support form the body, but rather as using it as a conjoined instrument." (CDA disp. 14, q. 1 no 2, p. 135)


"As interesting as it would be to compare these passages more fully, the point of this chapter is not to show that Suarez is a proto-Cartesian, but rather to show that the radical moves Suarez made within the tradition were quite well motivated. Thus historians of philosophy ingore the context of a thinker like Suarez with some peril when we read him simply as someone who did not understand Aquinas properly. In addition, that context is one that is decisively shaped by the philosophical movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and that fact, in turn, suggests that if we really want a proper appreciation of the transition to modern philosophy, we are likely to find it through additional explorations of sixteenth-century thinkers." (p. 136)

Cees Leijenhorst (Nijmegen): Suarez on Self-Awareness

I. Suarez on sensory self-knowledge

II. Suarez on intellectual self-knowledge

III. Suarez on intellective self-knowledge of the separate soul

"What we see here is a fine specimen of traditional Jesuit probabilistic reasoning. Suarez cast serious doubt on Aquinas' account of self-knowledge. He realized, however, that his argument takes him into domains very closely border on theological matters, more specifically the mode of being ad knowing of separate souls. Now as a Jesuit, Suarez was bound to defend the opinion of Aquinas in theology but not necessarily in philosophy. In philosophy, Suarez was anything but a faithful Thomist. More often than not he sided with Scotus against Aquinas. However, these borderline cases between scientia de anima, metaphysics, theology seem to be of an altogether different matter. Here, Suarez choose to be less outspoken and to decide the issue ad mentem Thomae. However, in the meantime Suarez had, with convincing reasons, shown that his anti-Thomistic rejection of the opposition between self-knowledge in this life and self-knowledge in the hereafter is 'probabilis,' which in the Jesuit vocabulary meant that it could be discussed and defended in the classroom. So Suarez had dropped his bomb, although in the end he runs away from its consequences. Suarez played the orthodox Thomist while making it very clear that Aquinas' view was in fact quite problematic." (p. 152)

  
IV. Conclusion

"We have seen that with respect to sensory self-awareness, Suarez was highly critical of Aquinas's views. Most importantly, Suarez defended the anti-Tomistic position that awareness of a sensory act is not the product of a separate act by the common sense. On the contrary, in its guise as 'vital act' each sensory act carried with it a form of pre-reflexive awareness that explains why if we see the colour red we are immediately aware of our seeing the colour red. Furthermore, Suarez also criticized Aquinas' account of self-knowledge of the separate soul. Suarez showed that Aquinas' asymmetry between mediated self-knowledge in this life and immediate per se self-knowledge in the hereafter leads to a set of insurmountable conflicts. on both of these issues Suarez showed a remarkable amount of originality and a surprising degree of autonomy with respect to the Doctor Universalis. But order to fully gauge the extent of Suarez's originality, his views would have to be compared with those developed by his fellow Jesuits, such as the Coimbra commentators, Franciscus Toletus, and others. This, however, requires further research, which has to wait for another occasion." (p. 152-153)

Marleen Rozemond (Toronto): Unity in the Multiplicity of Suarez's Soul

"According to an old and venerable view in the history of western philosophy, the human soul is a single, simple, indivisible entity. The view goes back as far as Plato, in particular his Phaedo. Furthermore, there is an old and venerable argument for this kind of view that finds its best-known expressions in the Second Paralogism in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. He stated the argument as follows:

   That the action of which can never be regarded as the concurrence of several things acting, is simple.
   Now the soul, or the thinking 'I', is such a being. Therefore, etc. A351

The argument proposes that the subject of thought must be simple because thinking is the kind of activity that can't be regarded as the 'concurrence of several things acting,' as would have to be the case for the action of a composite. Kant ... labeled the argument 'The Achilles of all dialectical inferences in the pure doctrine of the soul.' Following Kant it is often called 'the Achilles Argument.' The argument turns on what now are labeled issues around the 'unity of consciousness,' and it was widely used during the early modern period." (p. 154)

I. The soul as the root of its faculties

II. The soul's efficient causality

III. The unity in Suarez's soul and the Achilles Argument

IV. Suarez and the Achilles Argument: Similarities and differences

V. Conclusion

"In thinking that he powers of the soul are really distinct from it and from each other, Suarez attributes a kind of complexity to the soul that was common in Scholasticism but which seems to stand in marked contrast with the view widespread in the early modern period (and not nearly new with that period) that the soul is simple or indivisible. Significant problems arise from this ontological complexity in combination with Suarez's view that the powers can't interact, problems which we would now mostly classify as problems for the unity of consciousness. But Suarez was keenly aware of these problems and he offered solutions to them by arguing for a strong role of a single soul in the activities of its powers. And he uses this role to argue further that at the heart of this line of thinking there are some important ideas that have real affinity with the Achilles Argument. Stepping back from the details, it is striking to see that while, in marked contrast with the Achilles Argument, Suarez accepted the ontological complexity of the soul with its faculties, at the same time, like the proponents of the Achilles Argument, he saw the need for a single, unitary soul to explain the activities we now call properly mental, or even in his view, of living things more generally. 
       Suarez's conception of the soul was marked by several tensions: he regarded the soul as the principle of life generally, but focused his discussion of it on mental phenomena. He regarded souls as substantial forms, but focused on the atypical human soul. He thought the soul plus its faculties was one by aggregation, but saw a need for a single, unitary soul undelying the activities of these faculties. Buried, as it were, in Suarez's complex Aristotelian Scholastic soul there is single, unitary entity, whose involvement in its activities relies on attention, suggestive of the Cartesian unitary conscious subject, an entity that is 'the same soul' that senses, imagines, and understands.
      I have argued for a similarity between Suarez's line of thought and the early modern Achilles Argument. But there are also important differences. I have not aimed to establish any particular historical connections, and the early modern uses of the Achilles Argument. I have no views about such connections, and the early moderns had far too wide a range of philosophical views accessible to them for me to consider any claims of such kind. ... " (p. 172)

čtvrtek 23. srpna 2012

Hill/Lagerlund: The Philosophy of Francisco Suarez

Pár postřehů k třetí části knihy ("Natural Philosophy")
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Dennis Des Chene (St. Louis): Suarez on Propinquity and the Efficient Cause

Zajímavý článek, především analýza DM 18.8 (srv. 06.09.2010 a 01.08.2011). Pokud dobře rozumím, Suarez se snažil obhájit Tomášovo pojetí (pace Scotus), že veškerá účinná příčinnost se děje "nablízko" či nutně skrze médium. Pojmově připravil bezděky půdu pro mechanicismus. Shrnutí B. Hilla z úvodu:

 "Des Chene examines the formal characters attributed to efficient causation by Suarez. He indentifies four formal characters of efficient causation:
- the temporal priority of causes to effect;
- the principle of no action at a distance;
- the proportionality of the intensity of the effect to the strength of the total cause;
- the necessity of the effect given the occurrence of the cause.
Des Chene argues that these 'formal characters can be retained even as the principles of natural philosophz are transformed because they are independent of efficient causality's putative nature.' He turns his attention to Disputation 18.8, where Suarez addresses the propinquity and proportionality of causes to effects. The question Suarez addressed there were: can causes immediately act on things distant from it, and if not how can they mediately act on distant things? Suarez's answer to the first question is easy and staightforward - no. It is answering the second that requires much more work. Suarez's model for causal interaction at a distance requires causal action within a medium. But this account leads to two conceptual puzzles: (1) the difficulty of determining the sphere of action of bodily causes and (2) the rectilinear propagation of the influence of light. Suarez's account of the medium is especially important, according to Des Chene, because of its connection to Descartes' mechanistic account of bodily interaction. Because Descartes reduced all bodily causal interaction to immediate contact, Descartes' account of bodily causation made Suarez's model unnecessary, essentially dissolving it." (p. 9-10)


Des Chene (obecný úvod):

“In the Principles, Descartes declared that of the four Aristotelian causes, he would retain only one: the efficient. … Descartes’ claim would lead one to believe that he preserved the efficient cause—that hre at least we find continuity with the Aristotelian tradition. But it is reasonable to wonder whether, when from a foufould classification htree memebers are removed, the fourth can ramain unaltered.” p. 89.



Helen Hattab (Houston): Suarez's Last Stand for the Substantial Form (viz 03.06.2011)

Obecný metodologický úvod (opět pozapomenutá vlastní scholastická po-Suareziánská tradice):

"At first glance the metaphysical disputations devoted to natural causation seem to be the least likely place to look for evidence of Francisco Suarez as transformative figure inthe history of Western thought. Suarez's ponderous treatments of each of the four Aristotelian causes do not indicate an awareness of, or interest in the concurrent revivals of atomism and other rivals to Aristotelian natural philosophy. Nonetheless a cloeser examination suggests that his thoroughgoing efforts to revise, bolster, and systematize this part of the Scholastic edifice set the stage for the eventual replacements of Aristotelian natural philosophy by mechanism. I propose that Suarey can be seen as the tragic hero in the unfolding drama we call the scientific revolution: in working tirelessly and brilliantly to save Scholastic Aristotleinism, he so transformed it that the path for its dethronement emerged.
       However seeing just how his innovations might have had this effect is exceedingly difficult. Indeed just separating his innovations from mere reinforcements of the party line already poses a challenge. The layers of Scholastic commentary in which Suarez shrouded his contributions to the existing Scholastic debates and positions seamlessly blend novelty and tradition. Unlike the early moderns, who announced the novelty of their views with the sharp blows of a trumpet, Suarez quietly but steadily  worked behind the scenes to significantly alter the Aristotelian framework within which he operated. Identifying and understanding the groundbreaking changes he so subtly introduced thus require that we read the Metaphysical Disputations with three eyes, so to speak. One must look backwards to the Scholastic tradition to which Suarez responded, another must look forward to the early moderns who succeded him, and the third must scrutinize his texts and relate them to what the other two eyes see." (p. 101)

Hlavní téma - substantiální forma:

"To make this task a little more manageable I will limit myself to that most reviled and ridiculed of all Scholastic entities, the substantial form. [ p. 101] ... Writing for an audience that was exposed to numerous doubts about the existence of substantial forms as well as natural philosophies seeking to replace substantial forms with other principles, Suarez provided a very different justification for the substantial form.  ... Unlike the medieval commentators, Suarez did not begin with the distinction between the generation simpliciter of corporeal entities and accidental changes, such as a body becoming white or cold. Nor did he establish the existence of prime matter at the same time that he argues for the substantial form. Instead Suarez built up his argument for the substantial form from the immortality of the rational soul." (p. 102)

"One other feature of Suarez's account of the substantial form deserves mention before we delve ino the details and implications of Suarez's arguments for the existence of substantial forms. Thomas referred to the form of a substance in at least three different but closely related senses: (1) the form that actualizes the matter of a matter/form composite and causes it to be, for example, my individual soul; (2) the non-accidental form constituting the essence of a substance, in my case, my human form versus accidents like tallness; and (3) the definition that enables us to know a substance's essence and advance our scientific knowledge by means of demonstrative syllogisms. In Disputation 15 Suarez clearly separated these into (1) the physical form; (2) the metaphysical form; (3) the logical form. In addition he treated the physical form as the only true substantial from, downgrading the others to forms in a metaphorical sense. As the arguments we will next examine illustrate, this has the effect of privileging the role that substantial froms played in natural philosophy, as opposed to the forms appealed to in logic and metaphysics, and of emphasizing empirical arguments for the existence of the substantial form. This in turn has important implications for the advent of mechanism." (p. 104)

I. The existence of substantial forms


"Whereas Thomas simply left us with two different types of substantial forms (rational souls, which are subsisting incorporeal form, and inhering, perishable material forms that are educed from matter), Suarez, by basing his main argument for all substantial forms on the immortality of the rational soul, treated the subsisting incorporeal from as the model for all substantial froms and redefined them accordingly. This anticipates Descartes's characterization of all substantial froms, including the material ones, as little soul like substances attached to matter and could explain why Descartes takes the creation ex nihilo of the soul to be represtantative of the production of all substantial forms." (p. 104)

"The Thomists had to carve out a space for a non-inhering incorporeal form among corruptible corporeal forms to account for the immortality of the rational soul. In section one of Disputation 15 [srv. 01.09.2010 a 01.08.2011], Suarez instead treated the rational soul, a rather unusual type of substantial form, as paradigmativ and was thus faced with the challenge of showing that non-rational creatures likewise have something akin to a rational soul in them." (p. 105)

"Thus Suarez's strategy of defending the substantial form from the stronghold of the immortal rational soul had the potential to undermine the necessity of positing substantial forms in corruptible corporeal substances." (p. 105)

"We can draw several conclusions from this examination of Suarez's a posteriori arguments in favor of the substantial from. First the amount of space devoted to such arguments and the number of objections and counter arguments addressed indicate that empirical arguments against the substantial form were both common and taken seriously at the time. Second, unlike Thomas', Suarez's arguments for the existence of substantial forms in inanimante bodies were neither heavily dependent on Aristotle's texts nor on specific metaphysical doctrines. ... They were based on empirical observations, inferences to the best explanation, and methodological principles like 'one should not multiply entitties beyond necessity.' ... Finally, despite the fact that our skeptical, post-atomist rejection of natural kinds and real qualities prevents us from embracing them, these arguments represent the best of the time and would probaly have been convincing to most of Suarez's contemporaries." (p. 109)

"One has to keep in mind that during the period that Suarez was writing his Metaphysical Disputations, a consistent atomist or mechanistic physics had yet to be developed and so alternative explanatory principles to the elements, forms substances, and accidents of Scholastic Aristotelianism were rather limited. It is true that alchemists had already replaced Aristotle's four elements with their own and the Neoplatonists ahd adherents of natural magic appealed to forms emanating from the celestial sphere and occult qualities to explain certain phenomenta that resisted the Scholastic explanations, but they all operated within a basic non-mechanistic explanatory framework that utilized elements, forms, and the substance/accident distinction. Within this broadly Aristotelian framework Suarez's arguments in favor of the substantial form appear to triumph over its detractors. Nonetheless by separating and privileging the physical sense of form over the metaphysical and logical senses, by granting the impossibility of observing this substantial form, and by establishing its existence primarily by abduction from obseved effects, Suarez inadvertently undemined the case for substantial forms independently of this general framework. Once severed from the machinery of Scholastic logic and metaphysics, the substantial form hung only by the slender thread of fit between observation and theory. With the development of mechanical theories in natural philosophy that could explain the same effects, that thread by which Suarez defended substantial forms soon snapped. Indeed it took only a few decades after the publication of the Metaphysical Disputations for Descartes to declare substantial forms redundant by showing that an abduction to mechanical principles accounted for the same observed effects. Whereas Suarez arguments certainly did not aim at this result, indirectly his strategy of arguing for the actual existence of substantial forms independently of metaphysical and logical ground made it possible." (p. 110) 

II. The causality of substantial form as the formal cause of substance

"... in Suarez's hands the substantial form has been transformed into something quite different from what we find in Thomas. First of all it is not an act of existence perfecting matter and causing it to be. Rather the substantial from is an incomplete substance, which through the mode of its union with another incomplete substance (matter) formally causes a composite to be. Form and matter are equal partners in this union for Suarez. The substantial form is not prior to the matter by its action. In fact it does not even exercise formal causality by its action  ... For Suarez formal causality did not spring from a dynamic, emergent form that gives being to matter and orders its potencies to their ends. Formal causality is static; consisting merely in the manner of union that an already existing substantial form has with an already existing matter. ... Suarez's circumscribing of the role of the formal cause the union of the composite is consistent with and may in fact have prepared the ground for the subsequent de-emphasis of formal causation in natural philosophy. " (p. 114) 

III. The role of accidents in educing substantial forms

"... While specific historical links still need to be identified, from a purely conceptual standpoint it is not surprising that the post-Suarezian era included a range of attempts to bring atomist and corpuscularian explanations of cartain types of phenomena into a broader Aristotelian framework." (p. 117)

IV. Conclusion

"There are different ways in which philosophies can be transformative. Post enlightenment histories of philosophy tend to emphasize the transformative effect of philosophers responsible for methods, arguments, and results that stand out due to their novelty. Hence we keep coming back to Descartes' method of doubt, his cogito, and his dualism as well as Kant's critical method, his transcendental deductions, and his transcendental idealism. Until very recently historians of philosophy tended to ignore the scaffolding that makes the erection of such new systems possible. However, to advance in our understanding of the history of philosophy it is equally important to acknowledge the role of historical philosophers who provided such a scaffolding, no matter how quickly it was discarded once the new systems tooks hold. Suarez's contribution to modernity does not lie in novel methods or bold new types of argument. In no way did he anticipate Descartes' method of doubt or his cogito. Suarez remained firmly rooted in the methodologies of Scholastic Aristotelianism, marshalling the authorities on both sides of each issues and proceeding in true disputatonal style towards a resolution. Yet his contribution is no less important to our understanding od the advent of modern philosophy. As seens, the results of his disputations wre novel as compared to his predecessors and they provided a launching pad for later, more radical innovations. It is hard to imagine a mechanistic philosophy like Descartes' taking root in more traditional Thomist soil. However with Suarez's redefinition of the substantial form as an incomplete substance; his clear demarcation between the physical substantial from and the metaphorical forms of logic and metaphysics; his emphasis on empirical justifications of the substantial form; his reduction of formal causality to the mode of the union of the substantial form; his consequent privileging of material and efficient causality; and his weakening of the distinction between substantial and accidental change and the proportionateness requirement - Suarez provided fertile soil for the introduction of mechanical principles and explanations to do the work that substantial forms had done. Independently of how one assesses the value of the Scholastic approach to philosophy, one must acknowledge Suarez as one of its most ingenious and innovative, albeit tragic proponents. Tragic, because in his attempts to rescue the substantial form he made possible the means by which ir would be quickly replaced with mechanicism." (p. 118)


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